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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the online auction mechanism in the USA
is more effective at pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) than the traditional book building process.
Design/methodology/approach – The analysis compares the performance of online auction IPOs
with traditional IPOs issued in the same industry area and in the same year to assess the differences in
first day mispricing and its persistence. The paper compares the characteristics of firms choosing the
auction process relative to the traditional process. It also uses regression models to examine whether
online auction IPOs had a significantly lower first day price increase than traditional IPOs.
Findings – The results indicate that for 60 percent of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the
traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) area
had greater mispricing. The mispricing of online auction IPOs relative to traditional IPOs persist over
time for 50-80 percent of online auction IPOs. Regression analyses controlling for industry effects, year
effects, size of the issue, and type of traditional underwriter (low, medium, and high volume
underwriters) suggest that the auction’s first day price surges are not significantly lower than those of
traditional underwriters. Moreover, high volume traditional underwriters have statistically
significantly higher first day price surges than low volume traditional underwriters, supporting the
theory that they intentionally misprice to benefit their preferred clients. Firms choosing the auction
process tend to be smaller in terms of the number of shares of their IPO and their annual sales than
firms choosing the traditional IPO process. There is some overlap in industry sector and age, although
this varies by year.
Originality/value – This paper suggests that the auction process may not be as efficient in pricing
IPOs as was initially intended and that there are opportunities for further innovation and
improvement.
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I. Introduction and literature review
The resurgence in the initial public offering (IPO) market in 2007 in the USA and
overseas raises the question of whether the traditional IPO issuance process is more or
less efficient in pricing IPOs than the online auction process. Minimizing the first day
price surge of IPOs has been an important topic in the USA since the dot-com era, when
various dot-coms experienced substantial price growth from their initial price on the
first day; examples include Enel (966.9 percent), VA Linux (896.7 percent), and
Sycamore Networks (612.8 percent). In recent years, the average first day price surge
for an IPO has fallen. This is partially because the exuberance and uncertainty over
new technology in the dot-com boom has ended, and partially due to the initiation and
conclusion of legal proceedings by the then – New York State Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against many of the
underwriting investment banks which alleged that the investment banks had
manipulated IPO prices during the dot-com era to benefit their preferred clients.
Despite this, mispricing has continued[1], although on a smaller scale than was seen
during the dot-com boom[2]. This paper compares the performance of the traditional
IPO process in pricing new issues with the performance of the online auction process in
the USA, as well as provides some possible explanations for the results.
In the traditional IPO “book building” process, the underwriting investment banks
take the issue on a “road show” to various possible investors (often large mutual funds
or preferred clients of the investment bank) and build a demand curve of possible
prices for the IPO based upon the indications of interest that they receive from the
investors in terms of the price that they are willing to pay for the IPO and the number
of shares that they are willing to buy. Based on demand curve developed through this
“book building” process, the underwriting investment banks determine an “offer price”
for the IPO. The offer price is usually about 7 percent below the price at which the
underwriters purchase the shares of the IPO from the issuing company. The
underwriters then resell the shares of the IPO at the “offer price” to the institutional
investors and preferred clients of the investment bank who assisted them in pricing the
IPO through the “book building” process. The 7 percent spread between the price at
which the underwriters buy the IPO from the issuing company and the offer price at
which they resell the issue to their preferred clients represents the profits for the
underwriters[3]. When the IPOs price jumps up from the offer price on the first day of
trading, the investors receiving the initial allotments of the IPO benefit because they
were allocated the shares at the offer price by the underwriting investment bank. This
underpricing –, i.e. setting the offer price too low such that it jumps up on the first day
– suggests that the IPO may not have been accurately priced and represents “money
left on the table” to the issuing firm, because they sold the issue to the underwriters at
7 percent below the offer price and therefore could have obtained greater proceeds if
the offer price had been higher and had more accurately reflected the value of the
company. Indeed, Aggarwal et al. (2002) find a stronger positive relationship between
institutional allocation and underpricing than would be predicted by the premarket
demand. Consequently, developing a more accurate offer price, which will minimize
mispricing, is important (the Wall Street Journal, 2005a; Ian, 2005).
Loughran and Ritter (2004) discuss some of the causes for the underpricing in the
traditional IPO process during the dot-com era. They argue that executives of issuing




allocated shares of other new IPOs, so that they could benefit from the underpricing (and
the resulting first day price increase) in these IPOs – a practice known as “spinning.”
Loughran and Ritter (2004) also discuss the greater importance of analyst coverage
during the 1990s for IPOs (relative to other time periods), which made issuing firms more
likely to go to investment banks with the top analysts[4].
The development of the Dutch auction process, OpenIPO.com (which was developed
by Hambrecht, who had previously co-founded the investment bank Hambrecht & Quist
(the San Jose Business Journal, 1999)) was the mechanism for the issuance of Google’s
IPO and represents one of the most recent of the attempts to efficiently price IPOs so that
the underwriter receives a more accurate reflection of the economic value of the firm. The
online auction process debuted in February 1999 with the issuance of the IPO for
Ravenswood Wineries. As numerous press articles have noted, the Dutch auction
method would supposedly minimize or eliminate the first day price surge in IPOs[5] by
developing an offer price which is a more accurate reflection of the company’s value
through an auction rather than through the “book building” process. Under this method,
bidders post the price that they are willing to pay and the number of shares that they
wish to purchase. The auction is open for about two weeks, and bidders can change or
cancel their bids until the close of the auction. After the auction ends, OpenIPO.com
assembles the bids in order from highest to lowest, and then sets the offer price. All
bidders who bid above this price have their bids satisfied at this offer price, while those
who bid below it do not have their bids satisfied. This offer price is usually the highest
price at which all of the shares are sold, based on the cumulation of the bids[6]. If the
number of shares in the bids above the offer price exceeds the total number of shares
available in the offering, then shares are allocated on a “pro-rata” basis[7]. Unlike the
traditional method, in which the individuals participating in the setting of the offer price
are institutional investors and/or preferred clients of the underwriters, bidders in
the auction method can include smaller investors. The role of the investment bank as the
middleman is minimized. Generally, Hambrecht’s usual fee ranges from 4 to 6 percent
of the proceeds and is sometimes even less than that, which is lower than the 7 percent fee
charged by traditional underwriters (the Wall Street Journal, 2005a). But, is the online
auction process likely to solve the problem of underpricing and of the resulting first day
price surges for IPOs, or will it generate additional problems?
This analysis compares the first day mispricing of the online auction process
through OpenIPO.com with that of the IPO process using traditional underwriters and
examines whether the first day mispricing from the auction process persists over time.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the data and provides summary
statistics indicating differences in the first day mispricing of online auction IPO’s and
traditional IPO’s over time, as well as compares the characteristics of IPOs debuting
using each process in terms of their size, age, and industry sector. Section III presents
empirical results comparing the performance of the online auction IPO process and the
traditional IPO process by matching IPOs issued in the same year and in the same
industry sector by the two processes, as well as by using regression models controlling
for the industry sector and the size of the IPOs. Section III also examines whether the
first day mispricing from the online auction process persists over time. Section IV
presents some possible explanations for the lack of success of the online auction
process in efficiently pricing IPOs and provides some possible solutions. Finally,




Little work has been done on the empirical performance of IPO auctions; this
analysis contributes to the literature in that it empirically examines the performance of
the US online auction process and compares it to the results of the traditional IPO
process. Kandel et al. (1999) examine the demand schedules and elasticities of 27 Israeli
IPOs between 1993 and 1996, which debuted using a uniform price auction and find
underpricing and an average abnormal return on the first day of trading of 4.5 percent.
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) examine the Mise en Vente auction-like mechanism
used in France using data on 92 IPOs between 1983 and 1996 and find average
underpricing of about 13 percent. They also argue that the Dutch auction format can
lead to tacit collusion on the part of bidders and can lead to underpricing. Several
papers examine optimal mechanism design, including Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet
(2002) and Jagannathan and Sherman (2005). Sherman (2000) models how in a repeated
setting, underwriters can lower the excess returns of uninformed investors and thus
lower the degree of underpricing, as well as discusses how hybrid book building can
lead to greater underpricing than straight book building.
Carter et al. (2000) focus on the use of the internet to distribute an IPO to small
investors, but not to price it (as the online auction process does). They explore the
characteristics of IPOs which are underwritten by traditional underwriters, but which
allocate some portion of the initial shares to an online investment bank, such as Wit
Capital, which can then distribute them to small investors. Their analysis examined the
characteristics and behavior of 27 IPOs debuting between July and December 1998, so
both the dataset and the date of publication of the paper largely pre-dated the online
IPO auction pricing process, although the paper notes that the online auction process
had recently been developed. Their findings suggested that firms using the internet for
distribution were larger, used more reputable underwriters, and had younger CEOs.
They had greater volume and volatility than IPOs that chose the traditional
distribution mechanism. They also had higher returns, which the authors suggested
was due to the underwriter discounting the offer price to reflect the riskiness inherent
in this new method of distributing the IPO or due to the firms having younger CEOs.
Differences in information sets for investors provide explanations for IPO
underpricing in the traditional process. Rock (1986) develops a winner’s curse model in
which informed investors only invest in issues that they know are underpriced, thus
leading to greater underpricing by underwriters. Beneviste and Spindt (1989) develop
an information-gathering model, in which underpricing rewards informed investors for
providing information on demand, price, and quantity to the underwriters. Welch
(1989) provides a signaling model in which high quality firms tend to underprice.
Lee et al. (1999), using data on the Singapore stock exchange, show that large investors
with better information request participation in IPOs with higher initial returns, thus
being one of the first papers to document that larger investors have an informational
advantage[8]. Other papers, such as Field (1997), suggest that institutional investors
may be better informed about IPO value than other investors. Carter and Manaster
(1990) discuss how IPOs with higher returns have more informed investor capital. The
analysis in this paper finds that the online process did not exhibit significantly lower
underpricing than the traditional process, as had been initially intended by its
founders. In Section V, the paper discusses how one reason for the auction
underpricing may be that there is greater participation of smaller investors, who are




Another strand of the literature examines how IPO firms perform following their
debut, such as Jain and Kini (1994), Ritter (1991), and Teoh et al. (1998). Krignam et al.
(1999) examine underwriters pricing errors and show that first-day “winners” continue
to be “winners” and that first-day “dogs” continue to be “dogs.” Section IV of this
analysis examines whether the mispricing of online auction IPOs continues to exceed
the mispricing of traditional IPOs over time (one week, two weeks, four weeks, 60 days,
90 days, 180 days, one year after debuting) and finds that a greater degree of
mispricing relative to traditional IPOs persists for 50-80 percent of online auction IPOs.
II. Data and summary statistics
This section describes some of the differences between the online auction process and
the traditional IPO issuance process, both in terms of their comparative performance
over the years, and in terms of their characteristics, such as the size and the industry
sector of the firms using each of the processes to issue an IPO. The data, which are
from SDC Platinum, consist of all IPOs issued by both the traditional underwriters and
the online underwriter in the USA between February 1999 and June 2005.
Table I subdivides the IPOs into those issued by the online auction process and
those issued by traditional underwriters. Traditional underwriters are then subdivided
into low volume underwriters, medium volume underwriters, and high volume
underwriters. This paper defines low volume underwriters to be underwriting
investment banks which served as primary lead bookrunner on under 14 IPOs between
1999 and 2005, medium volume underwriters to be underwriting investment banks
which served as primary lead bookrunner for between 14 IPOs and 40 IPOs, and high
volume underwriters to be underwriting investment banks which served as primary
lead bookrunner for over 40 IPOs. Table I shows summary statistics, by underwriter
category, on the total number of underwriters in that category, the number of IPOs, the
percentage of total IPOs underwritten by each category of underwriter, and the
average principal amount, size, and first day price surge of an IPO underwritten by an
underwriter in each category.
Several interesting observations can be drawn from Table I. First, despite the
publicity surrounding the process, the number of IPOs issued by the online auction
process is small relative to the number issued by the traditional process. Within the
traditional process, there are comparatively few high and medium volume
underwriters, but they issue collectively over 80 percent of the IPOs. Second, based
on these averages, the first day price increase of an IPO issued through the auction
process is 29-30 percent, which is lower than the average for all of the traditional
underwriters at 38 percent. This is consistent with the intention of the auction process
to minimize mispricing. Nevertheless, when one segments the traditional underwriters
into low, medium, and high volume underwriters, the auction process is more efficient
than high volume underwriters (48 percent), as efficient as a medium volume
underwriter (29 percent), and less efficient than low volume underwriters (10 percent).
One would think that low volume underwriters, since they have less experience, should
be less efficient at pricing IPOs than high volume underwriters. Nevertheless, the high
volume underwriters were the investment banks who paid fines for allegedly
intentionally underpricing IPOs to benefit their preferred clients, who received the
initial allocations. Third, despite the fact that the degree of first day mispricing is much


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to be similar to IPOs underwritten by low volume underwriters in terms of the number
of shares in the average IPO and in terms of the average principal amount raised in the
IPO (if one excludes Google in examining the auction process). Fourth, Google raised
an unusually large amount for an auction IPO at almost $2 billion.
Table II compares the online auction IPOs and the IPOs issued through the
traditional process based on industry sector as measured by the two-digit SIC code.
Almost two third of traditional IPOs were in the same industry area as the IPOs issued
by the auction process. Both processes had over 20 percent of their IPOs in the
software/online services area, due to the growth of the internet at the time, and both
had 7-8 percent of their IPOs in the area of manufacturing telecomm equipment and
energy components. The auction process, however, had a greater emphasis than the
traditional process in the soft drink/coffee industry area, the biotech and
pharmaceutical area, the restaurant area, the online retail and catalog area, and the
online financial services and loan services area. Table III shows the industry
breakdown for traditional IPOs across all industry sectors (not just the ones
overlapping with auction IPOs). Two of the top four industry areas for auction IPOs
were also in the top four sectors for traditional IPOs (SIC 7300 and 2800). Six of the top
ten industry sectors for traditional IPO issuance were the same industry areas as for
auction IPOs. Nevertheless, when one compares IPOs issued in the same industry
sector between the traditional process and the auction process (Table II), the size of the
issue in terms of number of shares is much smaller. The average number of shares of
an auction IPO ranges from 5 percent of the average number of shares of a traditional
IPO (SIC 2800) to over 50 percent (SIC 6700). Similarly, the average principal amount
raised in an auction IPO ranged from 12 percent of the amount raised by the traditional
IPO (SIC 5800) to 66 percent of the amount raised in a traditional IPO (SIC 6200). In
many industry areas, the principal amount raised in auction IPOs was 30-50 percent of
the amount raised in traditional IPOs (SIC 2800, 3600, 5900, 6100, and 6700). The only
sector in which the share size and the average principal amount raised was greater for
auction IPOs than traditional IPOs was in SIC 7300 when Google is included. If Google
is excluded (see note in Table II), then the average number of shares for auction IPOs in
SIC 7300 is about 58 percent of the average number of shares of a traditional IPO in SIC
7300 and the average principal amount for auction IPOs is 66 percent of the amount
raised by traditional IPOs. In short, while there was some overlap in industry area
between online auction IPOs and traditional IPOs, auction IPOs tended to be smaller in
terms of the principal amount raised and the number of shares in the issue.
Table IV compares the percentage of technology IPOs issued in each year through
the online auction process and through the traditional IPO process. The definition of a
technology IPO follows Loughran and Ritter (2004), and includes IPOs in SIC codes
3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679,
3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374,
7375, 7378, and 7379. In four of the seven years, the online auction process had no tech
IPOs and, consequently, had a smaller percentage of IPOs debuting in this more
broadly defined technology sector than in the traditional process. In three of the seven
years, the online auction process had a higher percentage of technology IPOs than the
traditional process. One explanation for the greater degree of mispricing in the online
auction IPO process relative to the traditional process (seen in the averages in Table I)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Business description for companies going public in




7300 Development of software and online services 26.70
6700 Bank holding companies and closed-end investment
funds 18.47
3600 Manufacturing of electrical and energy components
and telecommunications equipment 7.88
2800 Manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and biotech
drugs 6.79
4800 Provide wireless internet and telecomm service,
broadband, VOIP; own and operate radio, cable, and
TV stations 5.98
3800 Manufacturing medical and biotech equipment 4.09
8700 Drug R&D services, cancer treatment research 2.47
6300 Health services (including insurance) 2.42
5900 Own and operate various services: sporting goods,
online retail, catalog companies 2.13
5900 Own and operate various service businesses:
sporting goods, catalog companies, and online retail 2.13
6200 Provide brokerage and investment banking services;
online financial services 1.84
6200 Provide brokerage and investment banking services;
online financial services 1.84
3500 Manufacturing surface mining machinery, data
storage, fiber optics, printing equipment, and flight
info computers 1.78
1300 Oil and gas exploration and production 1.61
6000 Commercial banks, savings and loans, and
associated holding companies 1.38
4900 Electric and gas utilities; electrical and geothermal
power 1.21
6100 Loan services (payday loans, student loans),
mortgage banks, credit card services 1.15
6100 Loan services (payday loans, student loans);
mortgage banks; and credit card services 1.15
8000 Own and operate hospitals, surgery centers,
laboratories 1.04
4400 Shipping companies; water transportation services 0.92
8200 Own and operate schools, educational services,
educational software, etc. 0.86
5000 Wholesaler of autos, computers, and roofing
materials 0.86
5800 Own and operate restaurants 0.81
2000 Meat-packing plants; canned foods, soft drinks,
coffee, fruit juices 0.63
3700 Manufacturing aircraft, railroad cars, tanks,
snowmobiles, and auto parts 0.58
6500 Real services 0.46










process and that technology IPOs were more underpriced because they were in
developing industries whose potential was harder to estimate at the time. Nevertheless,
the data do not support this hypothesis because there was often a smaller percentage of
technology IPOs debuting using the auction process than in the traditional process.
Two-digit SIC code
Business description for companies going public in




3300 Steel and aluminum production 0.40
4600 Crude oil pipeline operator 0.40
4500 Airlines 0.40
1200 Coal mining services 0.40
5100 Manufacturing herbal drugs, dietary supplements;
pharmacies 0.40
5600 Clothing retail stores 0.40
4200 Provided trucking, relocation, and courier services 0.40
1500 Residential and commercial construction 0.29
5700 Furniture and appliance stores; video game stores;
online film stores 0.29
7000 Own and operate casino hotels and hotel casinos 0.29
3900 Manufacturing collectibles – candles, golf equation 0.29
6400 Insurance agents and brokers 0.29
5400 Convenience stores; bread stores, doughnut and ice
cream stores 0.23
2700 Publishing 0.23
1000 Metal, gold, and palladium mining 0.17
7900 Operate gyms; golf instruction 0.17
3000 Manufacturing plastic containers and products 0.17
3200 Manufacturing glass containers, ready-mix concrete,
and chemicals 0.17
7200 Misc – coin-operated laundries; tax preparation






















The firms which went public using the online auction process had characteristics
similar to firms that went public using the traditional process. The author obtained
data on the age of the issuing firm, sales and net income of the firm in the 12 months
prior to its IPO, and on the age and salary of its CEO by examining the S-3 that each
firm, which debuted using the online auction process, had filed with the SEC. IPOs
debuting using the online auction process were about nine years old, on average. If one
excludes Morningstar and Peet’s Coffee, which were over 20 years old when they went
public, the average age was 6.3 years. Table V compares the age of a firm using the
traditional process with the age of a firm using the online process on a year-by-year
basis. In four of the seven years, firms using the online auction process were actually
slightly older than firms using the traditional process. Examination of the S-3s also
indicated that the base salary of the CEOs averaged $185,294 and the age of the CEO
averaged around 51 years. The Ernst & Young IPO Study found that the average age
for CEOs of firms who immediately qualified for listing in the Russell 2000 Index
following their IPO using the traditional process was between 50 and 54 years and that
the median age of the firm itself was eight to nine years old. This is similar to the
pattern seen in this analysis for firms using the online auction process.








Notes: Data for the median age of online issuers comes from the aggregation of information on the age
of each online issuer obtained by the author through examining each company’s S-3 filing with the
SEC; composite median age data on traditional issuers are from the Field-Ritter dataset on founding
dates for firms going public in the US during 1975-2006
Table V.
Comparison of median




Percentage of technology IPOs through
traditional underwriters









Notes: The yearly percentages of technology IPOs issued through traditional underwriters and the
online auction process were derived by the author from underlying raw data on SIC codes from SDC
Platinum, the definition of technology IPOs includes IPOs in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578,
3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841,
3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379
Source: Loughran and Ritter (2004, Appendix D)
Table IV.
Yearly comparison of the
percentage of technology
IPOs issued through the
traditional IPO process






Table VI compares the distribution of sales for a firm debuting using the traditional
IPO process in the year preceding its IPO during the 1980s, the 1990s, the height of the
dot-com bubble, and the 2000s, with the distribution of sales for firms debuting using
the online auction process. The table suggests that the online auction process had a
greater percentage of smaller firms with annual sales of under $10 million than the
traditional IPO process at any period, with the exception of the 1999-2000 period (the
peak of the dot-com era). The online process had similar percentages to the traditional
IPO process in terms of the percentage of firms with sales between $10 and $20 million,
between $20 and $50 million, and between $50 and $100 million. The online auction
process had a smaller percentage of firms with sales greater than $100 million and
greater than $200 million than the traditional process in every period, except during the
peak of the dot-com period, when the percentages were similar. The conclusion that
the online auction process tended to have a greater fraction of smaller firms than the
traditional process, the same fraction of intermediate-size firms, and a smaller fraction
of really large firms is consistent with the pattern in the data on the number of shares
issued for online auction IPOs relative to the number of shares of IPOs issued by the
traditional process (Tables I and II).
Table VII compares the average first day price surge for online auction IPOs with
those of low, medium, and high volume traditional underwriters across the entire
five-year period, and on a yearly basis. The first row reflects the findings previously
discussed for Table I: although the average first day price increase for online issuers is
higher than the average for traditional issuers, when traditional issuers are
decomposed by volume of IPOs issued, the online process is less efficient than low
volume underwriters, as efficient as medium volume underwriters, and more efficient
than high volume underwriters. Second, the table compares the first day price surge by
type of underwriter on a yearly basis – the degree of mispricing (as measured by
















Sales between $0 and $10
million 19.5 19.4 38.9 15.3 36.36
Sales between $10 and $20
million 12.4 11.0 16.3 4.7 9.09
Sales between $20 and $50
million 23.3 22.2 17.6 14.5 18.8
Sales between $50 and $100
million 17.4 16.6 10.4 15.6 18.18
Sales between $100 and $200
million 11.8 12.8 6.7 13.5 9.09
Sales greater than $200 million 14.3 18.0 10.1 36.5 9.09
Notes: The chart compares the sales in the 12 months preceding an IPO for firms using the traditional
IPO process and firms using the online auction IPO process; data for the sales of firms using the online
auction process comes from the aggregation of information on the sales of each online issuer obtained
by the author through examining each company’s S-3 filing with the SEC
Source: Data on the sales for firms using the traditional IPO process comes from Ritter (2008)
Table VI.
Comparison of average
annual sales for IPOs
debuting using the
traditional process and






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































first day price surges by





and high volume underwriters 42.8 percent of the time (in three of the seven years).
Consequently, this suggests that the online process may not be as efficient in pricing as
was originally intended. Moreover, an analysis of the average first day price surge per
underwriter over the five-year period across all underwriters indicates that the average
first day price surge for IPOs issued by WR Hambrecht’s OpenIPO.com online auction
mechanism met or exceeded the first day price surge for 82.4 percent of the primary
lead bookrunners (108 out of 131) in the sample.
The results in Table VII also suggest that while the first day surges in an IPOs price
are important, the problem that the online auction mechanism was partially developed
to solve has lessened. The average first day price increase has dropped substantially
from the 55.4-92.5 percent range during 1999-2001 into the 6.3-8.6 percent range of
2002-2004. This gradual reduction in the magnitude of first day price surges over time
may be a reflection of more careful pricing by some underwriters in the wake of
substantial litigation concerning their alleged manipulation of IPOs, as discussed in the
introduction[9]. Many of the investment banks with the top analysts and which
engaged in “spinning” and “laddering” included some of the high volume traditional
issuers in my analysis, which explains why their underpricing was so substantial – in
many cases, the executives of the issuing firms were willing to accept underpricing in
return for shares in other “hot” IPOs or in return for favorable coverage from the top
analysts in the industry.
A second explanation for the high degree of underpricing during the dot-com era
and the subsequent reduction in underpricing following the collapse of the bubble may
be that many of the technology IPOs during the dot-com boom were in emerging
industries, and, since most investors had a superficial understanding of the
fundamentals and technology in these industries, they had difficulty in accurately
pricing the issues and were influenced by “herd behavior.” Indeed, at the peak of the
dot-com bubble in 1999, over half of the IPOs issued through the online process and the
traditional process were technology IPOs, using Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) criteria,
as was evident in Table IV.
In short, the summary statistics in this section yield several key findings. First, the
degree of underpricing has fallen over time, possibly due to the role of litigation in
eliminating anticompetitive practices, such as “spinning,” as detailed in Loughran and
Ritter (2004), and possibly due to the declining fraction of technology IPOs. Second,
IPOs issued through the online auction process had a greater degree of average
underpricing than low volume issuers and a lesser degree of average underpricing than
high volume issuers. This suggests that the online auction process may not have been
successful in its objective to minimize underpricing, although it did have lower average
underpricing than traditional issuers when the three types are aggregated.
Are there differences in the types of firms choosing the online auction process
relative to the traditional process for their IPO? Almost two third of traditional IPOs
were in the same industry area as the IPOs issued by the online auction process,
although the auction process had a greater emphasis in the soft drink/coffee industry
area, the biotech and pharmaceutical area, the restaurant area, the online retail and
catalog area, and the online financial services and loan services area. In four of the
seven years, the online auction process had no tech IPOs and, consequently, had a
smaller percentage of IPOs debuting in this more broadly defined technology sector




process had a higher percentage of technology IPOs. Second, the IPOs debuting using
the online auction process was smaller than IPOs debuting using the traditional
process. This was true even if one matched the industry areas and compared the
number of shares in an auction IPO and in a traditional IPO, as in Table II. The average
number of shares of an auction IPO ranged from 5 percent of the average number of
shares of a traditional IPO to over 50 percent. Similarly, the average principal amount
raised in an auction IPO ranged from 12 percent of the amount raised by the traditional
IPO to 66 percent. Not surprisingly, when the author examined sales in the 12 months
preceding an IPO, the online auction process tended to have a greater fraction of
smaller firms (as measured by sales) than the traditional process, the same fraction of
intermediate-size firms, and a smaller fraction of larger firms. Age of the debuting firm
did not differ substantially between firms choosing the auction process and firms
choosing the traditional process: in four of the seven years, the auction IPOs were
slightly older, and in three of the seven years, they were somewhat younger than IPOs
using the traditional process.
III. Empirical results and sensitivity analysis
This section analyses whether the first day price surge exhibited by online auction
IPOs is significantly higher than the first day price surge exhibited by traditional IPOs,
controlling for various factors, such as the year, and several factors capturing the
characteristics and risk of these IPOs. These factors include the industry of the issuing
firm (as measured by the two-digit SIC code), as well as the size of the firm (as
measured by the number of shares in its IPO). Other measures describing the
characteristics of the firms going public were highly correlated with the industry and
the size of the issue and so were not helpful in describing the differences in
underpricing. For example, smaller firms as measured by sales or net income were
likely to have smaller IPOs (as measured by the number of shares) than larger firms, so
the number of shares variable picked up most of these differences, as was suggested by
the summary data in Section II. Also, the number of shares was important to include
because IPOs with a smaller number of shares could have greater underpricing if there
were alot of pent-up demand relative to the supply of shares offered, which then would
manifest itself when the IPO began to trade. The industry variables were important in
describing risk because many of the traditional and online IPOs during this period
were technology IPOs, and were often smaller, younger companies. Age of the
company was not helpful in the regression specifications during this period both
because, as described in Section II, there were not significant differences in age
between the online IPOs and the traditional IPOs, and also because the industry codes
often picked up the same type of information as age variables. The lack of significance
of age was also seen in Loughran and Ritter (2004) during the 1999-2000 period and the
2001-2003 period[10]. Consequently, the regression results reported in the tables focus
on the specifications using industry fixed effects by two-digit SIC code and IPO size in
terms of number of shares to capture the firm-specific characteristics, since other
iterations using similar metrics (age, etc.) yielded similar results.
As noted in the earlier tables, significantly more traditional IPOs were issued than
auction IPOs. Consequently, Table VIII matches each auction IPO with a traditional
IPO issued in the same year and in the same industry area as measured by the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IPOs and traditional IPOs
in the same three-digit





more than one traditional IPO issued in the same three-digit SIC code and in the same
year, so their performance was compared to the average of the traditional IPOs issued
in the same three-digit SIC code in the same year. The fifth column shows the
difference in the percentage mispricing between the auction IPO and the traditional
IPO – in four tenth of the IPOs (40 percent), the auction IPOs degree of mispricing was
more than 7 percent greater than the percentage price surge of the comparable
traditional IPO. The last column in Table VIII shows the percentage of traditional IPOs
issued in the same three-digit SIC code and in the same year which had greater
mispricing than the auction IPO. For 60 percent (six out of ten) of the auction IPOs,
over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three-digit SIC
area had greater mispricing. This suggests that the online auction mechanism is not as
efficient in minimizing the first day price surge as some have thought.
Table IX shows the results of the regression estimating the first day price surge for
an IPO as a function of SIC code dummies (for industry effects), year dummies (for year
effects), a dummy variable for whether the IPO was issued through the online auction
process, and variable for the number of shares issued in each IPO (to control for the size
of the issue and of the firm) during the 1999-2005 period. The results indicate that
online auction IPOs do not have statistically significantly higher or lower first day
price surges than traditional IPOs, when controlling for year/industry effects, and the
size of the issue. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 3.78, p ¼ 0.0000),
the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.72, p ¼ 0.0001), and the coefficient for
the number of shares outstanding was significant.
The models in Tables X-XII include dummy variables for the various types of
traditional underwriters – low volume traditional underwriters, medium volume
traditional underwriters, and high volume traditional underwriters – with one of them
left out to serve as the base case. The model in Table X includes dummy variables for
medium volume underwriters and high volume underwriters, in addition to dummy
variables for year effects, industry effects, and whether the IPO debuted using the
online auction process. The results indicate that online auction IPOs do not have a
statistically significantly higher or lower first day price surges than traditional IPOs,
when controlling for year and industry effects, relative to the base case. The results
also suggested that high volume underwriters had statistically significantly higher
first day price surges than low volume underwriters (the base case). Although the first
day price surges are not statistically significantly different between online auction
IPOs and low volume underwriters (the base case) or between medium volume
underwriters and the base case, the sign on the online auction IPO coefficient is
positive and the sign for the coefficient for medium volume underwriters is also
positive. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.40, p ¼ 0.0000), the year
effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.43, p ¼ 0.0296), and the medium and high
volume effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.88, p ¼ 0.0563).
The model in Table XI differs from the model in Table X in that the dummy
variables for low volume underwriters and high volume underwriters are included
such that the base case is medium volume traditional underwriters, rather than high
volume traditional underwriters (Table IV). Again, the results indicate that online
auction IPOs do not have a statistically significantly higher or lower first day price
surge than traditional IPOs, when controlling for year and industry effects, and the





Dummy 1999 0.482 * 0.209
Dummy 2000 0.291 0.212
Dummy 2002 20.095 0.236
Dummy 2003 20.353 0.251
Dummy 2004 20.169 0.211
Dummy 2005 20.258 0.257
Online auction dummy 0.526 0.530
Number of shares 0.000 * 0.000
SIC 6300 21.672 1.965
SIC 1300 20.570 1.974
SIC 3600 20.378 1.950
SIC 3800 20.422 1.955
SIC 5100 20.452 2.075
SIC 6700 21.043 1.946
SIC 7300 20.154 1.946
SIC 2800 20.519 1.951
SIC 3500 0.006 1.974
SIC 6000 20.605 1.983
SIC 1500 20.521 2.128
SIC 1000 21.149 2.244
SIC 3700 20.934 2.035
SIC 3100 20.812 2.378
SIC 4800 21.008 1.954
SIC 5900 20.421 1.968
SIC 5000 20.478 2.006
SIC 5800 20.610 2.003
SIC 8000 20.469 1.991
SIC 8200 20.725 2.006
SIC 5600 20.364 2.077
SIC 8700 20.453 1.965
SIC 1600 20.614 2.377
SIC 6500 20.553 2.061
SIC 4200 21.144 2.079
SIC 4400 20.523 2.002
SIC 4700 20.069 2.077
SIC 6200 21.270 1.970
SIC 7800 20.810 2.061
SIC 7900 20.363 2.242
SIC 5700 20.416 2.128
SIC 3400 21.432 2.379
SIC 4900 21.053 1.986
SIC 6100 20.993 1.990
SIC 2200 20.638 2.748
SIC 7000 20.799 2.128
SIC 1200 20.969 2.073
SIC 3000 21.182 2.242
SIC 3900 20.847 2.129
SIC 4500 20.847 2.077
SIC 740 20.981 2.736
SIC 2000 21.771 2.015
(continued )
Table IX.
The impact of the online
auction process on an
IPO’s first day price
surge, controlling for year
effects, industry effects,




suggests a higher price surge for online auction IPOs relative to the base case of
medium volume underwriters, but, again the coefficient is not significant. Similarly,
neither high volume underwriters nor low volume underwriters have significantly
different first day price surges from medium volume underwriters, although the sign
for high volume underwriters was positive and the sign for low volume underwriters
was negative, as is consistent with the averages for low, medium, and high volume
underwriters in Tables I and VII. The industry effects were jointly significant
(F ¼ 4.40, p ¼ 0.0000), the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.35, p ¼ 0.0293),
and the medium and high volume effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.93,
p ¼ 0.0539).
The model in Table XII differs from the model in Table XI in that the dummy
variables for low volume and medium volume underwriters are included such that the
base case is high volume traditional underwriters, rather than medium volume
traditional underwriters. Again, the results indicate that online auction IPOs do not
have a statistically different first day price surge in magnitude than high volume
underwriters (the base case), when controlling for year/industry effects, and the type of
traditional underwriter, although the sign on the online auction IPO (relative to the
base case) is negative. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.40,
p ¼ 0.0000), the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.35, p ¼ 0.0290), and the
medium and high volume effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.97, p ¼ 0.0514). The
results also suggested that low volume underwriters have a significantly lower first
day price surge relative to the high volume underwriter base case. Medium volume
underwriters did not have a significantly different first day price surge (although the
sign on the coefficient was negative).
Variable Coefficient SE
SIC 3200 20.510 2.242
SIC 7200 21.067 2.239
SIC 1400 20.743 2.378
SIC 5400 0.552 2.172
SIC 1700 20.790 2.744
SIC 180 21.260 2.744
SIC 2300 20.029 2.379
SIC 2500 20.582 2.379
SIC 2600 22.376 2.745
SIC 3300 8.606 * 2.083
SIC 4600 20.440 2.075
SIC 5500 20.513 2.746
SIC 6400 20.553 2.126
SIC 5300 20.886 2.744
SIC 5200 20.707 2.378
SIC 7500 21.082 2.379
SIC 2700 21.033 2.172
SIC 2900 20.841 2.746
SIC 750 1.384 2.744
_Cons 0.262 1.935
Notes: Significant at *5 percent; (first day price surge)i ¼ a þ m (SIC code dummies)i þ





Dummy 1999 20.232 0.252
Dummy 2000 20.294 0.255
Dummy 2002 20.694 * 0.284
Dummy 2003 20.680 * 0.303
Dummy 2004 20.666 * 0.254
Dummy 2005 20.740 * 0.310
Auction dummy 0.300 0.650
Medium volume traditional underwriter 0.151 0.199
High volume traditional underwriter 0.354 * 0.156
SIC 6300 0.075 2.368
SIC 1300 0.043 2.381
SIC 3600 0.530 2.352
SIC 3800 0.184 2.358
SIC 5100 0.153 2.503
SIC 6700 0.078 2.346
SIC 7300 0.517 2.347
SIC 2800 0.184 2.354
SIC 3500 0.729 2.380
SIC 6000 0.085 2.392
SIC 1500 0.078 2.566
SIC 1000 20.008 2.707
SIC 3700 0.075 2.454
SIC 3100 20.015 2.868
SIC 4800 0.092 2.356
SIC 5900 0.239 2.374
SIC 5000 0.227 2.419
SIC 5800 0.113 2.418
SIC 8000 20.009 2.401
SIC 8200 20.174 2.419
SIC 5600 0.308 2.505
SIC 8700 0.227 2.369
SIC 1600 0.032 2.868
SIC 6500 0.223 2.486
SIC 4200 0.150 2.507
SIC 4400 0.217 2.415
SIC 4700 0.607 2.505
SIC 6200 20.020 2.375
SIC 7800 0.124 2.485
SIC 7900 0.278 2.704
SIC 5700 0.385 2.567
SIC 3400 20.048 2.869
SIC 4900 20.104 2.395
SIC 6100 0.185 2.399
SIC 2200 0.167 3.314
SIC 7000 0.207 2.567
SIC 1200 20.115 2.500
SIC 3000 20.380 2.704
SIC 3900 0.012 2.567
SIC 4500 0.072 2.505
SIC 740 20.639 3.299
(continued )
Table X.
The impact of the online
auction process on an
IPOs first day price
surge, compared with





In summary, Tables IX-XII suggest that online auction IPOs do not have a statistically
significantly higher or lower price surge than traditional IPOs or any subset of
traditional IPOs (low, medium, or high volume underwriters). Nevertheless, within the
category of traditional underwriters, low volume underwriters have a statistically
significantly lower first day price surge than high volume underwriters, which is
surprising given that high volume underwriters have had more experience in
underwriting IPOs and therefore should exhibit a lesser degree of mispricing. This
may be because high volume underwriters were intentionally underpricing IPOs,
which is consistent with the allegations against many investment banks by the
New York State Attorney General’s Office during 2002 and 2003, as previously
discussed. Medium volume underwriters did not have statistically significantly
different first day price surges from high volume underwriters, although the sign on
the coefficient was negative.
Tables XIII-XX provide a sensitivity analysis of the regression models. They
includes several different formulations, some of which include or exclude year effects,
industry effects, dummy variables for type of traditional underwriter, and measures of
the size of the issue, in various combinations. While the models in Tables IX-XII are the
most appropriate, as will be discussed, for measuring whether online auction IPOs
have a significantly lower first day price surge than traditional underwriters, the
models listed in the table also show that, regardless of the specification, the online
auction IPOs do not have a statistically significantly lower price surge than traditional
IPOs, as had been originally intended. Tables XIII, XV, XVII, and XIX provide a
Variable Coefficient SE
SIC 2000 0.019 2.430
SIC 3200 0.072 2.705
SIC 7200 20.047 2.699
SIC 1400 20.096 2.868
SIC 5400 1.183 2.620
SIC 1700 20.279 3.309
SIC 180 20.337 3.309
SIC 2300 0.477 2.870
SIC 2500 0.224 2.868
SIC 2600 20.279 3.309
SIC 3300 14.290 * 2.500
SIC 4600 0.014 2.503
SIC 5500 0.140 3.312
SIC 6400 0.157 2.564
SIC 5300 0.013 3.312
SIC 5200 0.068 2.869
SIC 7500 0.427 2.870
SIC 2700 0.223 2.619
SIC 2900 0.299 3.312
SIC 750 2.225 3.312
_Cons 0.218 2.338
Notes: Significant at *5 percent; (first day price surge)i ¼ a þ b (year dummies)i þ m (SIC code
dummies)i þ C (online auction IPO dummy)I þ t (medium volume underwriter dummy)i þ w(high





Dummy 1999 20.232 0.252
Dummy 2000 20.295 0.255
Dummy 2002 20.695 * 0.284
Dummy 2003 20.681 * 0.303
Dummy 2004 20.667 * 0.254
Dummy 2005 20.741 * 0.310
Auction dummy 0.143 0.651
Low volume traditional underwriter 2 0.161 0.198
High volume traditional underwriter 0.197 0.162
SIC 6300 0.075 2.368
SIC 1300 0.044 2.381
SIC 3600 0.530 2.352
SIC 3800 0.185 2.358
SIC 5100 0.153 2.503
SIC 6700 0.079 2.346
SIC 7300 0.517 2.346
SIC 2800 0.184 2.353
SIC 3500 0.730 2.380
SIC 6000 0.087 2.392
SIC 1500 0.080 2.566
SIC 1000 20.004 2.707
SIC 3700 0.077 2.454
SIC 3100 20.012 2.868
SIC 4800 0.093 2.356
SIC 5900 0.240 2.374
SIC 5000 0.227 2.419
SIC 5800 0.112 2.418
SIC 8000 20.009 2.401
SIC 8200 20.174 2.419
SIC 5600 0.309 2.505
SIC 8700 0.228 2.369
SIC 1600 0.036 2.868
SIC 6500 0.224 2.486
SIC 4200 0.151 2.507
SIC 4400 0.219 2.415
SIC 4700 0.609 2.505
SIC 6200 20.013 2.375
SIC 7800 0.127 2.485
SIC 7900 0.281 2.704
SIC 5700 0.386 2.566
SIC 3400 20.046 2.869
SIC 4900 20.102 2.395
SIC 6100 0.186 2.399
SIC 2200 0.168 3.314
SIC 7000 0.208 2.566
SIC 1200 20.116 2.500
SIC 3000 20.377 2.704
SIC 3900 0.015 2.567
SIC 4500 0.074 2.505
SIC 740 20.639 3.299
(continued )
Table XI.
The impact of the online
auction process on an
IPOs first day price surge






summary of the coefficients and their p-values in the various model formulations, while
Tables XIV, XVI, XVIII, and XX provide a summary across the models of joint
significance for year effects, industry effects, and inclusion of dummy variables by
type of traditional underwriter.
Tables XIII and XIV show the statistical results and the tests for the model
specifications for Models I-III. All three models indicate that the online auction
dummy is statistically insignificant. Model I only includes year effects, which are
jointly significant. Model II includes year and industry effects, both of which are jointly
significant. Model III includes year effects, industry effects, and a variable controlling
for the size of the issue. The year effects and industry effects are jointly significant, and
the variable controlling for the size of the issue is statistically significant. Inclusion of
the variable controlling for the size of the issue increased the adjusted R 2 of the model
to 0.392, which is consequently an improvement on Model I (0.009) and Model II (0.114).
Model III is the basic model in Table IX and is the most effective of the basic models in
estimating whether online auction IPOs have a lower first day surge than traditional
IPOs, without including variables on whether the traditional underwriters are low
volume, medium volume, or high volume underwriters.
Tables XV and XVI show the statistical results and the tests for model
specifications for Models IV-VI. Again, all three models indicate that the online auction
dummy is statistically insignificant. Models IV-VI have year effects, but not industry
effects or a variable for the size of the issue, and include dummy variables for whether
the traditional underwriters are low volume, medium volume, or high volume.
Variable Coefficient SE
SIC 2000 0.021 2.430
SIC 3200 0.074 2.704
SIC 7200 20.047 2.699
SIC 1400 20.095 2.868
SIC 5400 1.187 2.620
SIC 1700 20.278 3.309
SIC 180 20.337 3.309
SIC 2300 0.481 2.870
SIC 2500 0.225 2.868
SIC 2600 20.278 3.309
SIC 3300 14.291 2.500
SIC 4600 0.014 2.502
SIC 5500 0.141 3.312
SIC 6400 0.159 2.564
SIC 5300 0.018 3.311
SIC 5200 0.066 2.869
SIC 7500 0.428 2.870
SIC 2700 0.225 2.619
SIC 2900 0.300 3.312
SIC 750 2.231 3.312
_Cons 0.375 2.339
Notes: Significant at *5 percent; (first day price surge)i ¼ a þ b (year dummies)i þ m (SIC code
dummies)i þ C (online auction IPO dummy)I þ y (low volume underwriter dummy)i þ w (high





Dummy 1999 20.234 0.252
Dummy 2000 20.296 0.255
Dummy 2002 20.697 * 0.284
Dummy 2003 20.682 * 0.303
Dummy 2004 20.668 * 0.254
Dummy 2005 20.742 0.310
Auction dummy 2 0.056 0.641
Low volume traditional underwriter 2 0.360 * 0.155
Medium volume traditional underwriter 2 0.204 0.163
SIC 6300 0.077 2.368
SIC 1300 0.046 2.381
SIC 3600 0.532 2.352
SIC 3800 0.187 2.358
SIC 5100 0.157 2.503
SIC 6700 0.081 2.346
SIC 7300 0.520 2.346
SIC 2800 0.187 2.353
SIC 3500 0.732 2.380
SIC 6000 0.090 2.392
SIC 1500 0.081 2.566
SIC 1000 20.002 2.707
SIC 3700 0.079 2.454
SIC 3100 20.010 2.868
SIC 4800 0.095 2.355
SIC 5900 0.243 2.373
SIC 5000 0.230 2.419
SIC 5800 0.117 2.418
SIC 8000 20.007 2.401
SIC 8200 20.171 2.419
SIC 5600 0.311 2.505
SIC 8700 0.230 2.369
SIC 1600 0.037 2.868
SIC 6500 0.227 2.486
SIC 4200 0.152 2.507
SIC 4400 0.221 2.415
SIC 4700 0.610 2.505
SIC 6200 20.006 2.375
SIC 7800 0.128 2.485
SIC 7900 0.282 2.704
SIC 5700 0.389 2.566
SIC 3400 20.044 2.869
SIC 4900 20.101 2.395
SIC 6100 0.189 2.399
SIC 2200 0.169 3.314
SIC 7000 0.209 2.566
SIC 1200 20.114 2.499
SIC 3000 20.376 2.704
SIC 3900 0.016 2.567
SIC 4500 0.075 2.505
SIC 740 20.639 3.299
(continued )
Table XII.
The impact of the online
auction process on an
IPOs first day price surge






Models IV-VI differ based on which one is the base case. The year effects and the
traditional volume IPO underwriter dummies are jointly significant in all of the models.
Tables XVII and XVIII show the statistical results and the tests for model
specifications for Models VII-IX. Again, all three models indicate that the online
auction dummy is statistically insignificant. Models VII-IX differ from Models IV-VI in
that they have added industry effects, which are jointly significant. Again, the year
effects and the traditional underwriter indicator variables are jointly significant.
Owing to inclusion of year effects, these models are an improvement on Models IV-VI
and their results are described in more detail in Tables X-XII, which were discussed
earlier in this section.
Tables XIX and XX show the statistical results and the tests for model
specifications for Models X-XII. As in the other models, the online auction dummy is
statistically insignificant. These models differ from Models VII-IX in that they include
a variable for the size of the IPO, in addition to year effects, industry effects, and
dummy variables for the type of underwriter. With the inclusion of a variable
controlling for the number of shares in each issue, the volume dummies for traditional
underwriters become jointly insignificant, although their inclusion was jointly
significant in the models which did not include a variable controlling for the number of
shares in each issue. This is not surprising since high volume underwriters have, on
average, a greater number of shares in the IPOs that they issue (the average number of
shares in an IPO is 14,600,000) than medium volume underwriters (7,806,649 shares)
and low volume underwriters (5,841,266 shares) so the dummy variables for type
Variable Coefficient SE
SIC 2000 0.023 2.430
SIC 3200 0.075 2.704
SIC 7200 20.046 2.699
SIC 1400 20.094 2.868
SIC 5400 1.188 2.620
SIC 1700 20.277 3.309
SIC 180 20.335 3.309
SIC 2300 0.482 2.870
SIC 2500 0.226 2.868
SIC 2600 20.277 3.309
SIC 3300 14.293 * 2.500
SIC 4600 0.016 2.502
SIC 5500 0.142 3.311
SIC 6400 0.161 2.564
SIC 5300 0.021 3.311
SIC 5200 0.071 2.869
SIC 7500 0.433 2.870
SIC 2700 0.226 2.619
SIC 2900 0.301 3.311
SIC 750 2.233 3.312
_Cons 0.573 2.333
Notes: Significant at *5 percent; (first day price surge)i ¼ a þ b (year dummies)i þ m (SIC code
dummies)i þ C (online auction IPO dummy)I þ y (low volume underwriter dummy)i þ t(medium
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of underwriter are picking up some of the same effects that were incorporated into the
variable for the number of shares of the issue. Also, as seen in other studies, such as
Loughran and Ritter (2004), smaller firms are less likely to go public using a “high
prestige” underwriter[12]. These “high prestige” underwriters, as defined by Loughran
and Ritter (2004), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Carter et al. (1998), are largely the
same as the high volume underwriters in this analysis – large, well-known investment
banks which underwrite a number of IPOs.
Since separation of traditional underwriters into low, medium, and high volume
underwriters is important to the analysis, the models in Tables XVII and XVIII are
more appropriate than the models in Tables XIX and XX for comparing the size of the
first day price surge. These models were described in more detail in Tables X-XII. For
models in which all of the traditional underwriters are combined together, the most
appropriate model is one which includes a variable controlling for the size of the issue
and of the firm, but which excludes dummy variables for the type of traditional
underwriter. This was the model in Table IX.
In summary, these models suggest that regardless of the specification of the model,
IPOs which are issued through the online auction mechanism do not have first price
surges which are statistically significantly different from the traditional IPOs. The sign
on the online auction IPO is positive in nine of the 12 models; the only models in which
the sign is negative are in three of the models with among the poorer fits (Models I, IV,
and VII). This suggests that the first day price increase tends to be statistically
insignificantly higher for IPOs issued through the online auction process, controlling
for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, size of the IPO, and whether the traditional
underwriter is a high volume underwriter, a low volume underwriter, or a medium
volume underwriter.
The models also provide information on the size of the first day price surge between
the various types of traditional underwriters. Models IV-VI, which have only year
effects, but not industry effects, suggest that low volume underwriters have a
statistically significantly lower price surge than high volume underwriters, and that
medium volume underwriters have a lower price surge than high volume underwriters
and a higher price surge than low volume underwriters, although the results are not
statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the average first day price
surges for low volume, medium volume, and high volume underwriters in Tables I and
VII. Models VII-IX differ from Models IV-VI in that they add industry fixed effects,
which are jointly significant; the conclusions and results, however, are identical.
Models X-XII differ from Models VII-IX in that they add a variable controlling for the
size of the issue. Since inclusion of this variable makes the volume dummies for
traditional IPO underwriters unnecessary (as can be seen in their statistical
insignificance) because high volume underwriters, on average, issue larger IPOs, these
models are not as useful as the previous sets in evaluating the relative behavior of the
three types of traditional underwriters. Nevertheless, although the results are
statistically insignificant, the sign of the low volume coefficients tend to support
the hypothesis that low volume underwriters have lower first day price increases than
medium or high volume underwriters.
Although the online auction IPOs exhibit some degree of mispricing, does it persist
over time to a greater degree than the mispricing exhibited by IPOs issued through the




time periods: after the first day of trading, after one week of trading, after two weeks of
trading, after four weeks of trading, after 60 days of trading, after 90 days of trading,
after 180 days of trading, and after one year of trading. The second column shows the
percentage of online auction IPOs whose absolute percentage price increase from
the original offer price exceeds that of the comparable traditional IPO, issued in the
same year and in the same three-digit industry SIC code. The table indicates that, for
most time periods, generally over 60 percent of online IPOs still have a greater degree
of mispricing relative to their original offer price, when compared to the degree of
mispricing exhibited by their traditional counterpart. This suggests that the offer price
set in auctions is less reflective of the true value of the company than the offer price set
through the traditional process.
In summary, the analysis suggests that the auction process tends to be more
efficient, on average, than the traditional processes of many medium to high volume
underwriters, and less efficient on average than the traditional processes of many
low volume underwriters. Although one would have expected medium and high
volume underwriters to be more efficient at pricing IPOs because they have had the
opportunity to price so many of them, they are also more likely than low volume
underwriters to have a large client base and to possibly reward their clients who assist
them in the initial book-building process by mispricing the IPO so that these clients can
benefit from the price increase on the first day of trading. When analysing the average
first day price surges by underwriter across all underwriters, the average first day
price surge for OpenIPO.com exceeds the average first day price increase for
82.4 percent of the underwriters. When examining together all IPOs in all SIC codes
issued by all underwriters, use of the online auction issuance process had a
consistently statistically insignificant impact on the first day price increase. This was
Time period
Percentage of online auction IPOs whose absolute
percentage price change from the offer price exceeds
that of comparable traditional IPOs issued in their
three-digit SIC industry area in the same year
After one day of trading 77.78 (7/9)
After one week of trading 66.67 (6/9)
After two weeks of trading 62.5 (5/8)
After four weeks of trading 75 (6/8)
After 60 days of trading 50 (4/8)
After 90 days of trading 37.5 (3/8)
After 180 days of trading 62.5 (5/8)
After one year of trading 83.3 (5/6)
Notes: This table compares the frequency for which the absolute value of the percentage change in
the stock price for IPOs issued through the online auction mechanism exceeds the absolute value of the
percentage change of the average of IPOs issued through the traditional process in the same three-digit
SIC industry area in the same year, the analysis compares these numbers at various time intervals
following issuance of the online auction IPO and the traditional IPOs; the absolute value of the
percentage change measures the degree to which mispricing (relative to the offer price) occurs; the
findings in this table are consistent with the hypothesis that the online auction IPO process does not












also confirmed by t-tests of the differences between the mean degree of underpricing
for online auction IPOs and low, medium, and high volume underwriters.
IV. Possible causes and solutions to potential problems in the online
auction process
The online process is not as successful as had been hoped in minimizing the first-day
price surges of IPOs. Although, by its structure, it eliminates potentially intentional
mispricing by underwriters to benefit the larger financial institutions who assist them
in building a “book” of orders, the online auction process still leads to mispricing.
Possible causes of this mispricing include:
. a lack of information on the part of the small investors relative to larger financial
institutions;
. an adverse selection problem concerning the types of firms which choose to issue
online; and
. inherent conservatism on the part of investors in using a new process.
This section discusses these factors as possible causes of the mispricing problem
inherent in auctions, examines applications of these factors in the IPO debut of Google
(August 2004) and Morningstar (May 2005), and assesses possible solutions.
The mispricing in online auctions may be due to the involvement of small investors,
who do not have access to detailed sources of information on the company. The
investment banks and institutional investors who price the IPO in the traditional
process analyse companies routinely, and also have a greater capability than small
investors to meet with and interview representatives of the issuing firm. Firms that do
their IPO through the online auction process do not have to provide as much
information concerning their uses of funds as they would in the traditional process.
This is because the investment banks, under the online auction process, do not engage
in the “book-building” process. Examples of types of information that issuing firms
could provide which would be useful to investors include:
. the uses for the capital that they are raising;
. their strategies for overcoming potential challenges;
. the corporate governance mechanisms within the firm (share of outsiders on the
board, etc.);
. their reasons for using the online auction process, rather than the traditional
process; and
. their involvement in any current or potential litigation.
As investors become more familiar with the auction process, they may be less likely to
bid conservatively in the presence of greater information.
The degree of mispricing for Google was more substantial than the performance of
comparable IPOs in its industry group which debuted in the same year using the
traditional method. Google’s offer price was $85 and it closed at $100.34, reflecting an
18 percent increase, while the average first day price increase for all IPOs issued in
2004 was 8.6 percent. Indeed, analysis of the data shows that 82 percent of the IPO’s




first day of trading than Google did. Google’s first day price increase also exceeded that
of IPOs in its peer group: about 70 percent of the IPOs in its three-digit SIC code issued
in 2004 experienced less of a first day price increase and about 60 percent of the IPOs in
Google’s four-digit SIC code, focusing largely on the internet search arena, exhibited
less of a first day price increase.
One of the criticisms of Google was that it was “secretive” in how it would use its
funds and conveyed little detailed information (the Wall Street Journal, 2004a). At the
time, Google faced several strategic issues, which in the absence of more detailed
information on the uses of the capital to be raised, may have been difficult for the
smaller investors to evaluate. These included Google’s lack of diversification in
revenue sources and reliance on online advertising, rather than on the other
subscription-based services (unlike Yahoo and Microsoft). Despite the lack of external
transparency in Google’s strategic processes, it has continued to surpass analysts’
earnings expectations. Nevertheless, the online process could be used more by
companies, which may not have a clear sense of the uses for the funds that they are
raising or their uses of funds may not be appropriately assessed by smaller investors if
enough information is not provided to them.
In the case of Google’s auction, many informed investors – institutional investors
and hedge funds – entered in the market after the stock had debuted, contributing to
its upward price momentum (The Washington Post, 2004a, b); their earlier entry might
have provided greater price support in developing the offer price. Nevertheless, the
larger investment banks felt “locked out of the process,” and lacked financial incentives
to push Google’s IPO to their clients. This may also have been the case for other online
auction IPOs.
The recent SEC proposals to liberalize the “quiet period” may provide a solution to
the possible informational problems inherent in the online auction process. During the
“quiet period,” companies traditionally have been only allowed to give out information
orally (in presentations), but not in written form (except for the company’s prospectus).
Consequently, the “quiet period” increased the informational disadvantage of small
investors relative to larger institutional investors, since smaller investors are less likely
to be able to attend company presentations and more likely to be reliant on written
documents available to the public. In late October 2004, the SEC voted to liberalize
these rules by allowing companies planning an IPO to communicate information to
investors verbally or in writing, provided that this information would be filed with the
SEC (the Wall Street Journal, 2004b). Indeed, the SEC has also proposed to allow the
marketing “roadshows” of IPOs to be broadcast online to all investors, although this is
not a requirement such that companies which only want to present materials before the
traditional audience can do so (the Wall Street Journal, 2005b). Smaller and less
well-known companies, previously handicapped by their inability to use the media and
the web during the “quiet period” to generate interest, are more likely to stimulate
investor enthusiasm in their IPO (the Investment Dealers Digest, 2004). This relaxation
of the “quiet period” restrictions will make it easier for companies using the online
auction process to provide small investors with information if the company wants to do
so. With the relaxation of the “quiet period” restrictions, companies can minimize the
informational problems inherent in auctions.
A second potential flaw of the online process lies in the possibility of an adverse




which could lead to a lemons “discount” being placed on these issues by uninformed
investors[13]. Since firms using the online process are not subjected to the rigorous
interviews of the investment banks in the traditional “book-building” process, firms
which are well-known, but which would have had difficulty in going public for some
reason using the traditional IPO process may be more likely to use the online auction
mechanism. For example, when Morningstar, which rates mutual funds, decided to go
public using the online auction process in January 2005, it did so at a time when it was
under legal investigation and when its IPO filing under the traditional process had
consequently been dormant since May 2004. In September 2004, Morningstar was the
subject of an SEC investigation concerning inaccurate data which had been on its
website. In December 2004, Eliot Spitzer, as well as the SEC, began looking into
possible conflicts of interest from Morningstar Associates’ recommendations to 401(k)
on mutual fund investment options, while Morningstar itself provides fund ratings
(the Wall Street Journal, 2005a; Stein, 2005). Indeed, Morgan Stanley executives warned
Morningstar that “an auction carried a high risk of an ‘adverse outcome,’” such that
when Morningstar continued with the auction, instead of switching back to the
traditional process, Morgan Stanley resigned as the lead underwriter (Smith, 2005).
Morningstar’s pricing behavior suggests that the online auction initially underpriced
it: the stock opened on May 3, 2005 at $18.66 and closed at $20.05. By the second week
in June 2005, it was trading in the high $20s per share, by November 2005, it was
trading in the mid $30s per share, and, by December 30, 2005, it was trading around
$34-$35 per share. As of April 2008, it was trading around $54 per share. This
explanation is similar to the “changing risk composition” hypothesis, discussed in
Ritter (1984) in which underpricing increases in an IPO market as the proportion of
IPOs that are perceived as “risky” increases. Nevertheless, the sources of “risk” would
lie more in the lack of information provided by the issuing firm than in other
characteristics. As we showed previously in our comparison of characteristics of
issuing firms using the online auction IPO process and the traditional IPO process, the
firms using the online auction IPO process have many similarities to firms using the
traditional IPO process in terms of company age, and industry. The main difference is
that, on average, they tend to issue a smaller number of shares, and that a higher
percentage of online auction IPOs are likely to have sales below $10 million than
traditional IPOs.
Inherent conservatism of investors may be a third explanation for the underpricing.
One of the lessons that investors learned in the dot-com boom is that a knowledge of
the underlying company is important in valuing it. Consequently, at least initially,
investors may be setting low offer prices for IPOs because of this lesson and because of
the relative youth of the auction process. Indeed, OpenIPO served as lead manager for
only four IPOs prior to 2001, by which time the market was declining and investors
were more wary in their bids. The inherent conservatism of investors in auctions may
have been a factor in the Google auction: the fund manager of the Legg Mason Value
Trust noted in his letter to shareholders that:
[. . .] many investors may have steered clear of the Google auction because “the determination
of what to bid would require considerable work [. . .]” we were delighted when the so-called
FUD [fear, uncertainty, doubt] dominated the process, resulting in the shares coming in at the





The online auction process was developed in response to the substantial increases
between IPOs offer prices and their open prices at the peak of the dot-com era. Table VII
suggests that while the first day surges in an IPOs price are important, the problem
that the online auction mechanism was partially developed to solve has lessened. The
average first day price increase has dropped substantially from the 55.4-92.5 percent
range during 1999-2001 into the 6.3-8.6 percent range of 2002-2004. This gradual
reduction in the magnitude of first day price surges over time may be a reflection of
more careful pricing by some underwriters in the wake of substantial litigation
concerning their alleged manipulation of IPOs, as well as that many of the IPOs during
the dot-com era were in emerging industries and therefore were difficult to price.
The findings of this analysis suggest that the online auction process does not
minimize the first day price surge of an IPO to the degree that was initially intended
when the process was developed. The types of firms choosing the auction IPO process
relative to the traditional IPO process tended to be smaller firms, as measured by sales
and number of shares in their IPO issue. Even controlling for the two-digit SIC industry
area, auction IPOs tended to be smaller than traditional IPOs. The percentage of
technology firms and the age distribution of the firms were similar between the online
and traditional process, although they varied from year to year – in four of the seven
years, the auction process hosted slightly older firms or had fewer technology IPOs than
the traditional process, while in three of the seven years, the opposite effects were seen.
Industry sector and number of shares in the IPO reflected many of the characteristics of
online and traditional firms, which also could be seen in age, sales, etc.
Regression analyses controlling for year and industry effects, as well as the size of
the IPO, suggest that the first day price surge of the online auction IPO process did not
statistically significantly differ from the first day price surge of the traditional process,
even when controlling for type of traditional underwriter (low volume, medium
volume, and high volume). A comparison of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs issued
in the same year and in the same three-digit SIC code suggests that for 60 percent (six
out of ten) of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that
year and in that three-digit SIC area had greater mispricing. High volume traditional
underwriters have a statistically significantly higher first day price surge than low
volume traditional underwriters, which is surprising because high volume
underwriters, due to the number of IPOs that they price, should be better able to
price an issue than low volume underwriters. This finding provides evidence
supporting the legal allegations against larger investment banks in 2002-2003 that they
may have been manipulating IPO prices during the dot-com era in an effort to reward
their preferred clients who assisted them in pricing the IPO. This analysis also finds
that the mispricing of online IPOs relative to their traditional counterparts issued in the
same three-digit SIC code and in the same year persists over time (one week, two
weeks, four weeks, 60 days, 90 days, 180 days, and one year after debuting) for 50-80
percent of online auction IPOs.
Although the online auction process increases the ability of small investors to
participate in the IPO process, the process may suffer from several problems. First,
small investors may lack the ability to efficiently price an IPO due to informational
asymmetries either because small investors lack access to the sources of information




detailed information in the online process since they do not undergo the rigorous
scrutiny of investment banks in the traditional bookbuilding process. Second, since the
informational scrutiny is reduced, the online process could be used more by companies
which may not have a clear sense of the uses for the funds that they are raising or by
well-known companies which may not have been successful in the traditional issuance
process. This could lead to an adverse selection problem, as investors could have
difficulty in distinguishing successful companies from “lemons,” and consequently
could end up discounting the price of all online IPOs.
Nevertheless, with interest in IPOs rebounding and the growing belief of small
investors that they can become involved early with new issues, it is likely that some of
the weaknesses of the online process may be improved. Some of the solutions include:
. the SEC reforms on the “quiet period,” which will minimize the informational
asymmetry between small investors and larger institutional investors; and
. greater provision of information by issuing companies concerning uses of capital
to be raised, etc. so that small investors can better distinguish good companies
from “lemons.”
Developing new methods of IPO issuance, increasing available information, and
involving more parties in the process are likely to lead to a more egalitarian and
transparent process for providing new companies with capital.
Notes
1. Indeed, in the first quarter of 2008, several IPOs exhibited substantial underpricing on their
first day, despite the declining financial markets. Asia Time Corporation (debuted February
11, 2008) exhibited a first day price increase of 142.9 percent, the RiskMetrics Group
(debuted January 24, 2008) exhibited a first day price increase of 35.7 percent, IPC (debuting
on January 24, 2008) and Visa (debuting on March 18, 2008) increased about 28-29 percent on
their first day, and Heritage Crystal Clean (debuted March 11, 2008) increased 23.4 percent
on its first day of trading (Renaissance Capital, 2008).
2. The decline in mispricing since the collapse of the dot-com boom is discussed in Loughran
and Ritter (2004).
3. Chen and Ritter (2000) examine various explanations for the large spreads in the USA
relative to other countries, and as well as why 7 percent is such a common spread.
4. Clarke et al. (2003) discussed how investment banks significantly boosted their share of IPOs
when they gained an all-star analyst who was highly ranked in the Institutional Investor
annual survey, and that this effect was greater in the mid to late 1990s than in the preceding
periods. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) noted that the presence of an all-star analyst raised
the probability that the underwriting investment bank employing the analyst would be
chosen as the lead underwriter. Both of these studies were also discussed in Loughran and
Ritter (2004).
5. For example, the Wall Street Journal (2005a) noted that the auction “method can sap the first
day price surges that IPOs typically enjoy,” while Ian (2005) notes “With an auction, the price
is usually set after aggregating bids and deciding the highest price at which the company
can sell its shares. This often saps any first-day pops in price that IPO’s typically enjoy.”
6. Available at: www.wrhambrecht.com (accessed January 21, 2008).
7. For example, if the offer price is set at $11 share, and there are 1 million shares available, but




bidders (who had initially bid above $11) pay $11 per share and receive 80 percent of the
shares for which they had bid because 1 million shares divided by 1.25 million shares is
80 percent. Available at: www.wrhambrecht.com (accessed January 21, 2008).
8. Several papers discuss the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in various countries, including
Loughran et al. (1994) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996).
9. Loughran and Ritter (2004, pp. 8-9) discuss some of the legal issues and settlements linked to
the behavior of underwriting investment banks during the dot-com era. For example, they
note that Robertston Stephens, in its settlement with the SEC and NASD in 2003, admitted to
allocating IPOs to clients on the basis of past and future commission business, and that
CSFB received commissions which were 65 percent of investor profits from IPOs, such as
VA Linux.
10. Many of the studies which use other variables to capture the characteristics of the firms,
such as Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Carter et al. (2000), do not use industry variables
based on two-digit SIC code or number of shares in the IPO because the effects captured by
these variables are often reflected in the regressors used in their specifications.
11. Table V includes only ten out of the 14 IPOs which debuted using the online auction process,
since the other four did not have comparable IPOs issued in the same year in the same
three-digit SIC industry area.
12. More prestigious underwriters are listed before the other underwriters in the non-managing
underwriting section of an IPOs prospectus in brackets, and underwriters which always
appear in the highest bracket receive a “9” on the nine-point scale. These “high prestige”
underwriters,” are underwriters with a ranking of “8” or higher on a nine-point scale.
13. Despite the fact that an individual “uninformed” investor may have less purchasing power
than a given “informed” investor, the aggregation across individual “uninformed” investors”
of “lemons discounts” in the bidding process could lead to substantial underpricing.
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